25 May 05
Originally posted by lucifershammerKind of. So is anyone responisble for the interpretation and implementation of "gods will" other than god? Should you really take it all on faith?
The Pope is more than just another believer. He holds a position that was instituted by God; his authority (in moral matters) was obtained from God. That does not mean, however, that he is a "spokesman" for God in the same way that (say) a Prophet is; or that God does not speak to the world directly or indirectly through other channels. Nor does it ...[text shortened]... an that everything the Pope does is "speaking for God". Does that answer your question?
25 May 05
Originally posted by dagsAt a basic level, each human being is responsible for interpreting the general norms of Divine Will and deciding how to implement them in a specific situation (e.g. how should I understand the Sixth Commandment and how does it apply to a situation where my friend's wife is hitting on me). Nevertheless, it makes perfect sense for God to set up some kind of authority when it comes to interpretation so that total chaos does not ensue. Can you imagine the chaos if the US did not have a Supreme Court and each citizen was free to interpret the Constitution as s/he saw fit?
Kind of. So is anyone responisble for the interpretation and implementation of "gods will" other than god? Should you really take it all on faith?
Your second question deals with whether one should take it on faith. The fact simply is, one takes plenty of things on faith every day. When I wake up, I take on faith that my clock actually shows the correct time until I see data to the contrary or I have had bad experiences in the past. When I go to the bus stop, I take on faith the bus times on the chart there in a similar fashion. And so on. So, clearly, taking things on faith is very much the norm for human beings.
25 May 05
Thats an interesting way to look at it all but faith in a clock telling the right time is not really the same as faith in a god. Who bears ultimate resonsibility for the interpretation of gods will? god or the person interpreting it. Should god have been a little more specific to prevent interpretive errors and hence the types of problems seen thoughout history (not just caused by christians but by many religions)?
25 May 05
Originally posted by dagsPeople who have faith in God generally fall into two categories:
Thats an interesting way to look at it all but faith in a clock telling the right time is not really the same as faith in a god. Who bears ultimate resonsibility for the interpretation of gods will? god or the person interpreting it. Should god have been a little more specific to prevent interpretive errors and hence the types of problems seen thoughout history (not just caused by christians but by many religions)?
1. Some people have had a direct "experience" of the divine or God, or have had experiences or observations in their life that convinces them that the existence of God is the only reasonable option
2. Most people who believe in God do so because that was what was taught to them by their parents or teachers or society. Since they have no reason to doubt their source on other matters, they trust them on this
If you follow the chain of "teachers" in (2), you will eventually end up at (1) in the vast majority of cases. Is this very different from faith in a clock telling the right time?
Should God have been more specific? It seems to me that, no matter how specific God tried to be, human language is always ambiguous enough to permit interpretive errors/ twisting of meaning (e.g. does Freedom of Expression allow a person to scream "Fire" outside a crowded theatre?). I believe that God was as specific as He needed to be and established the Church to point out interpretive errors.
25 May 05
Originally posted by lucifershammerSo you equate having faith with believing the conclusions of inductive arguments? How bizarre! I believe the sun will rise tomorrow, but this is not faith on my part, this is a belief epistemically justified by inductive evidence (the past instances of sun-risings). If your clock is normally set to the proper time, and if the buses normally run on time in your neck of the woods, then similar comments apply. If your clocks and bus schedules are normally inaccurate, then your 'faith' means merely 'unjustified belief'. Let's try to keep our epistemological categories clearly demarcated.
At a basic level, each human being is responsible for interpreting the general norms of Divine Will and deciding how to implement them in a specific situation (e.g. how should I understand the Sixth Commandment and how does it apply to a situation where my friend's wife is hitting on me). Nevertheless, it makes perfect sense for God to set up some ki ...[text shortened]... fashion. And so on. So, clearly, taking things on faith is very much the norm for human beings.
25 May 05
Originally posted by bbarr"Epistemically justified" - to whom? To the subject himself/herself or to another person?
So you equate having faith with believing the conclusions of inductive arguments? How bizarre! I believe the sun will rise tomorrow, but this is not faith on my part, this is a belief epistemically justified by inductive evidence (the past instances of sun-risings). If your clock is normally set to the proper time, and if the buses normally run on time in yo ...[text shortened]... y 'unjustified belief'. Let's try to keep our epistemological categories clearly demarcated.
26 May 05
Originally posted by bbarrOk, let's consider some scenarios:
This question is senseless. Epistemic norms are what they are, they are not set by anyone anymore than moral norms are set by anyone.
1. (Null case) I believe X but can offer no justification for it.
2. I believe X because I can deductively reason to X from propositions known to be true.
3. I believe X because I can inductively reason to X from propositions known to be true.
4. (Special case of 3?) I believe X because my mother, who has been reliable in the past, tells me it is true.
5. I believe X because a stranger, whom I've never met before, tells me it is true.
6. (Special case of 5?) I believe X because a fairy appeared to me and told me it was true.
Which of these are epistemically justified and which are not? Why or why not?
26 May 05
Originally posted by lucifershammerGo through the list and ask yourself the following question:
Ok, let's consider some scenarios:
1. (Null case) I believe X but can offer no justification for it.
2. I believe X because I can deductively reason to X from propositions known to be true.
3. I believe X because I can inductively reason to X from propositions known to be true.
4. (Special case of 3?) I believe X because my mother, who has been ...[text shortened]... me it was true.
Which of these are epistemically justified and which are not? Why or why not?
"Are the reasons available to me in this case sufficient to (minimally) make X more likely true than false?"
26 May 05
4 edits
Originally posted by bbarrI'm not familiar with the term Lottery Paradox, but it sounds like what I had in mind.
None come to mind other than the Lottery Paradox, but that relies upon a very dubious closure priniciple.
Suppose you see me put three balls -- red, green, and blue -- into a bag, and see me pull one out in my closed hand. Without seeing the ball, you know that:
It is more likely than not that the ball is not red.
It is more likely than not that the ball is not green.
It is more likely than not that the ball is not blue.
Thus, you would be justified, according to your criterion, in believing that, severally,
The ball is not red.
The ball is not green.
The ball is not blue.
It seems to me that the union of justified beliefs should also be justified, and thus
you would be justified in believing, jointly:
The ball is not red, nor green, nor blue.
Is this the Lottery Paradox?
26 May 05
1 edit
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesClose enough to the Lottery paradox to suffer from the same failing.
I'm not familiar with the term Lottery Paradox, but it sounds like what I had in mind.
Suppose you see me put three balls -- red, green, and blue -- into a bag, and see me pull one out in my closed hand. Without seeing the ball ...[text shortened]... l is not red, nor green, nor blue.
Is this the Lottery Paradox?
It seems to me that the union of justified beliefs should also be justified...
This is a version of the dubious closure principle I was referring to earlier. Make the relevant probabilities explicit in the beliefs above and see if the same putative paradox follows.
EDIT: Have I claimed that showing a belief more likely true than false is sufficient for justification? I was presenting that as merely a necessary condition.