Logic

Originally posted by googlefudge

I will concede that it makes sense to say that a term is being used incorrectly - vis-a-vis a given context.

That is pretty much all I am arguing. If you accept that then we are in agreement.

Oh, damn! 😉 I'll try harder next time. 😉

Originally posted by twhitehead
You may be using the wrong definition, but implicit in what you said, is the fact that there are two definitions, neither of which is, when used correctly, 'wrong'. It is just not what the original speaker (science in this case) meant by the word, so this is a case of misunderstanding (whether deliberately or otherwise) rather than a case of a word inhere ...[text shortened]... ations that word may carry with it, that were not necessary used when trying to apply the label.

I think when a creationist says evolution "is just a theory" the key word is just rather than theory. The use of the word just is designed to dismiss the theory without tackling any of the issues. In other words it is a rhetorical device.

Originally posted by twhitehead
You may be using the wrong definition, but implicit in what you said, is the fact that there are two definitions, neither of which is, when used correctly, 'wrong'. It is just not what the original speaker (science in this case) meant by the word, so this is a case of misunderstanding (whether deliberately or otherwise) rather than a case of a word inhere ...[text shortened]... ations that word may carry with it, that were not necessary used when trying to apply the label.

On a related note, a very common mistake I see a lot on this forum is the concept that if you can successfully make a word stick, then you can start making conclusions about something based on other connotations that word may carry with it, that were not necessary used when trying to apply the label.

Yes. that is one of the 'ways to use words wrongly' listed on the page I linked on LessWrong.

Otherwise see my response to visted, he's pretty much nailed it.

Originally posted by DeepThought
I think when a creationist says evolution "is just a theory" the key word is just rather than theory. The use of the word just is designed to dismiss the theory without tackling any of the issues. In other words it is a rhetorical device.

It wasn't necessarily the best example, but I did give several.

Originally posted by googlefudge
It wasn't necessarily the best example, but I did give several.

I found the original post. Possibly you could have contrasted hypothesis and theory, since the difference is fairly subtle. I can't think of a theory that has been termed a law in physics since the quantum/relativity revolution overturned Newtons laws.

The other two examples were too extreme, there is no way of using two to mean 147 and expect anyone to understand one, similarly using atheist to mean "can of vegetable soup" is too far removed from any known usage. A better one would be someone who used the word couple to mean several which is a plausible error; the conventional meaning of couple being exactly two could mean the inaccuracy wouldn't be noticeable to a casual listener.

Originally posted by DeepThought
I found the original post. Possibly you could have contrasted hypothesis and theory, since the difference is fairly subtle. I can't think of a theory that has been termed a law in physics since the quantum/relativity revolution overturned Newtons laws.

The other two examples were too extreme, there is no way of using two to mean 147 and expect anyon ...[text shortened]... couple being exactly two could mean the inaccuracy wouldn't be noticeable to a casual listener.

My point was to illustrate that it's possible to have proposed definitions that are
wrong, as a refutation of the suggestion that you couldn't have 'wrong definitions'.

So I picked ridiculous examples [or borrowed others ridiculous examples] to demonstrate
that you can in fact have wrong definitions thus establishing the principle.

After that you're just arguing over where the line is drawn, not that the line exists in the
first place.



On a side note, there are laws of gravity proposed by Einstein... they are just contained
within the overarching theoretical framework.

E=MC^2 is a law. It simply says that Energy and Mass are interchangeable according to
this relationship. And doesn't say how or why. Much like Newtons Law of gravity which
said that massive bodies are attracted to each other according to this relationship but
doesn't explain how or why.


And my point with the 'theory' example was that YEC's like to use the common English
meaning of the word theory [which is closer to, but not equivalent to, the scientific meaning
of the word hypothesis] in places where they should be using the scientific meaning
of the word theory. Or take the words of a scientist where they use the scientific meaning
and interpret it in terms of the common use definition.
In such cases I argue that the definition/meaning being used by the YEC is demonstrably
and objectively incorrect. In such a context the only valid meaning of the word is the scientific
one because only the scientific definition imparts the correct concepts for the discussion
being had. It may not be helpful to actually argue much about this, and may in fact be best
to ditch the word and just talk about the underlying concepts without mentioning the word
in question. But that's for the purpose of moving the discussion on, and dealing with the
real argument and not getting sidetracked into an irrelevant one.

That doesn't generally apply however to the meaning of words like atheist or agnostic ect
because those are labels tied up with lots of peoples identities. In those cases the label
is important in and of itself, and can't or shouldn't just be dropped to avoid arguments.
The identity IS what is being argued about.

Originally posted by googlefudge
...in places where they should be using the scientific meaning of the word theory.

I have to point out that the word has a range of meaning within science. When you study 'chemistry theory', then you are studying the ideas/concepts, equations etc of chemistry.
However, when you study Theoretical Chemistry, you are looking a bit deeper at how Quantum theory gives rise to chemistry.
When you say 'The Theory of Relativity' you are talking about 'a well-substantiated explanation of some aspect of the natural world that is acquired through the scientific method.'

So, for example, quantum theory, is not quite the same thing as the Theory or Quantum Mechanics.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_theory
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theoretical_chemistry
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mechanics
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_theory

Originally posted by twhitehead
I have to point out that the word has a range of meaning within science. When you study 'chemistry theory', then you are studying the ideas/concepts, equations etc of chemistry.
However, when you study Theoretical Chemistry, you are looking a bit deeper at how Quantum theory gives rise to chemistry.
When you say 'The Theory of Relativity' you are talkin ...[text shortened]... try
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mechanics
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_theory

None of which alters the fact that if you use an contextually incorrect definition you are using the wrong definition.

You are focussing on details that have no bearing on the topic at hand.

Originally posted by googlefudge
None of which alters the fact that if you use an contextually incorrect definition you are using the wrong definition.

'The wrong definition', not 'a wrong definition'.
But I don't think we actually disagree.

You are focussing on details that have no bearing on the topic at hand.
I just thought it was interesting to note how wide a range of meaning words can have even with a given domain or context.

Originally posted by DeepThought
I can't think of a theory that has been termed a law in physics since the quantum/relativity revolution overturned Newtons laws.

Theories have never been termed laws. They are two separate concepts. A law is a short statement of fact often written as an equation.
And there are plenty of laws that post date Quantum Mechanics/Relativity.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Theories have never been termed laws. They are two separate concepts. A law is a short statement of fact often written as an equation.
And there are plenty of laws that post date Quantum Mechanics/Relativity.

Yes, but this statement applies to Pauli's exclusion principle and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. They both fulfil the snappiness criterion as well the more formal criteria.

As an aside I don't really think E=mc^2 should count, as it is only true in the rest frame of the body under discussion - so fails the universality criterion. It's more of a definition. If one uses units where the speed of light is 1 it becomes E = m, when there's a total redundancy in concepts. It comes from the length of the energy momentum four vector being a constant we call the mass. In full, in natural units (c = 1), it is E^2 - p^2 = m^2 and defines the (inertial) mass in special relativity. This survives into quantum theory as something called the pole of the propagator.

Originally posted by DeepThought
I've read your posts. They are quite interesting, when I was originally writing the post about the problem of direct evidence of God's existence my main point was that faith becomes irrelevant in the face of such evidence. One can hardly not believe in what is under one's nose. The stuff about free will was an afterthought.

Regarding the sanctions ...[text shortened]... ut may be for others.

I'm curious as to why indeterministic libertarian views are incoherent.

I'm curious as to why indeterministic libertarian views are incoherent.

I think they are incoherent in virtue of the requirements they place on freedom. Under the generic libertarian view, it is a necessary condition for S's acting freely that it be possible that S do otherwise than what S in fact does. So, supposing that S performs action A at time t; then on the libertarian view, A is performed freely only if there is some possible world W such that W is nominally identically specified to the actual world up until t and it is not the case in W that S performs A at t. This constraint on freedom is popular, I guess, because it is intuitively appealing on the surface: specifically, it appeals to the intuition that the idea that S ought to have done otherwise entails that S could have done otherwise. It appeals to the intuition that S is free only to the extent that S has multiple live alternatives from which to choose.

But, if we dig deeper, this constraint on freedom is absurd and indefensible. The main reason why it is absurd is because it entails that S's free willings have no causally sufficient antecedents. If there were causally sufficient antecedents for S's performing A, then there could be no such W as described above, since those causally sufficient antecedents are preserved under identical specification mapping from the actual world and then there is no relevant possibility that S does not do A at t, from the definition of sufficiency. So, under libertarianism, it cannot be that one's free willings have causally sufficient antecedents. But, then, think about how absurd that is. First, an event that has no causally sufficient antecedents is a metaphysically random event. Second, if one's free willings do not have causally sufficient antecedents, then that rules out one's having sufficient reasons in virtue of which S acts; but if an action is not based on sufficient reasons, then it is effectively arbitrary. So, under libertarianism, "free" actions are both random and arbitrary. The requirement it places on freedom ensures that "free" actions are both metaphysically random and based on insufficient reason. So it is an absurd account, primarily because it severs the connection between choice and sufficient reason. The whole point of agency is that an agent acts from reasons that have the support of his or her evaluative commitments and character traits; indeed, that the agent is motivated to so act in virtue of the recognition of such reasons. But on a libertarian view, this connection is effectively severed and we are left with no rational explanation or accounting for one's supposedly "free" actions.

If you want to see how absurd it is, you can do a thought experiment. Suppose in W1 that DeepThought freely decides to A at time T. Now suppose there is W2, which is identically specified in all particulars to W1 up until time (T-delta), which of course means that DeepThought in W2 is identical to DeepThought in W1 up until arbitrarily close to T, including any and all mental states, motivational states, etc, etc. Now, to be consistent with libertarianism, suppose that DeepThought decides not to A in W2 at T. The question here is, what could possibly explain the fact that DeepThought decides to A in W1 at T, whereas DeepThought decides not to A in W2 at T? You cannot reasonably appeal to any set of particulars regarding W1 or W2 because that set will be identically specified in both worlds. More particularly, you cannot reasonably appeal to any set of particulars regarding DeepThought's physicality or mentality or personality traits, etc, because they are identically specified in both worlds. The fact seems to be that you cannot reasonably appeal to anything at all in explanation of these hypothetical facts. But, then, we can have no rational explanation that accounts for articles of "freedom" under libertarianism. One would have thought that the content of one's free willings should be in principle explainable and understandable in virtue of one's psychological states, such as one's dispositional traits and beliefs and motivational states, etc, etc, leading up to the event. Otherwise, if we have no genuine way to reference the content of one's actions back to those psychological traits that make one who he or she is, then why should those actions be credited to that person? Unfortunately, under libertarianism, we have no way of doing this, since the view requires a disconnect between free choices and sufficient reason sets, which are in turn partially constituted by one's psychological particulars.

I think this is a good example where surface intuition gets it spectacularly wrong. On these types of considerations and related ones, I have concluded that we have to look to compatibilism if we want any viable account of freedom.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
It's been in the discussion lately, but substitute "belief in God" with 'winning the lottery,' and see if the results are the same.

Your claim:
[b]The question of whether or not I believe in God is not a matter of what I choose to do, for I do not pick and choose such beliefs.

But then you admit:
It is an appointment with theoretical reaso ...[text shortened]... ice.
Buying one, not buying one: they're both equally valid options to a person with free will.

Sigh. Like I already clearly stated, this regards a confusion between practical and theoretical reasoning. Below is a link that may help you educate yourself on this distinction. In particular, I think it would benefit you to pay attention to the interpretation under which the distinction is one “between two different systems of norms: those for the regulation of action on the one hand, and those for the regulation of belief on the other.”

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/#PraTheRea

Originally posted by LemonJello

I'm curious as to why indeterministic libertarian views are incoherent.

I think they are incoherent in virtue of the requirements they place on freedom. Under the generic libertarian view, it is a necessary condition for S's acting freely that it be possible that S do otherwise than what S in fact does. So, supposing that S performs a ...[text shortened]... I have concluded that we have to look to compatibilism if we want any viable account of freedom.

Thanks for replying to me on this.

As far as I understand it your argument boils down to the idea that one is only free to act differently if one is making a random choice anyway. In which circumstance one's free will is vacuous. If one is making a considered choice then one will act the same in all identical worlds. So a theory of free will would have to be compatible with determinism, and any non-determinism in nature resulting from quantum theory or thermodynamics would simply be random and so not sufficient to build a theory of free will around.

Originally posted by DeepThought
Thanks for replying to me on this.

As far as I understand it your argument boils down to the idea that one is only free to act differently if one is making a random choice anyway. In which circumstance one's free will is vacuous. If one is making a considered choice then one will act the same in all identical worlds. So a theory of free will would ...[text shortened]... ermodynamics would simply be random and so not sufficient to build a theory of free will around.

As far as I understand it your argument boils down to the idea that one is only free to act differently if one is making a random choice anyway.

According to libertarian conceptions of freedom, an action is done freely only if one "could have done otherwise". But this in turn entails that one's free willings are without causally sufficient antecedents (and hence, as a corollary, random). But this is absurd on multiple levels. Most notably, it rules out as being free any action that is performed on the basis of sufficient reasons, reasons causally sufficient to elicit that action through motivation of the agent on recognition of those reasons.

If one is making a considered choice then one will act the same in all identical worlds.

I think this is surely true, since I think one's considered choices are determined by one's psychological states along with the reasons at one's access. However, this point is not necessary in order to argue the absurdity of libertarianism. To show that libertarian conceptions of freedom are deeply confused, it is not necessary to show that considered choices are determined. It is enough to show that a considered choice can still be a free one, even if it happens to be determined. Suppose that DeepThought deliberates and introspects about whether or not to perform A. Suppose that this engagement with deliberation reveals to DeepThought that there are clear reasons in favor of A-ing that soundly, or even overwhelmingly, outweigh considerations against A-ing. Suppose further that there is no coercion from any outside agency and that these reasons are the result of DeepThought's dispositional traits and faithfully reflect DeepThought's integral and abiding values and beliefs, are consistent with what DeepThought takes to be his project goals and ends, etc. Then, upon resolving to do A, there is every reason to think DeepThought is free. Freedom in this sense (and in the relevant sense that gives rise to moral desert) should be about personal autonomy, or self-governance. When he acts in this considered way, absent coercion and on the basis of reasons that motivate him, this is DeepThought exerting genuine self-governance over his own actions. Does this somehow get negated if it happens to be the case that these reasons are causally sufficient to so motivate DeepThought, such that he could not resolve otherwise under identically specified conditions? Of course not. And that's why libertarian conceptions are so confused.

In fact, I think there is a good argument to be made for the idea that our choices need to be determined by the agent's psychological particulars and reasons thereof in order for them to be free in the appropriate sense, but it is not necessary to make such a strong claim in order to show libertarianism false. Again, it is enough to show that a choice can be free even if it happens to be determined.

So a theory of free will would have to be compatible with determinism, and any non-determinism in nature resulting from quantum theory or thermodynamics would simply be random and so not sufficient to build a theory of free will around.

Yes, I think any viable account of free will would need to be compatible with determinism. (However, it would not need to entail or imply strict determinism.) And yes I would agree that non-deterministic aspects cannot undergird any viable account of free will (but may be broadly consistent with a viable account). I would be inclined to argue that sufficiency of reasons is integral and indispensable to freedom, since the alternative (insufficient reason) can only provide for arbitrarity.