Atheist vs. Agnostic

Originally posted by Palynka
This is a knife-edge definition that cannot hold for a non-zero measure of atheists as long as absence of evidence is considered as evidence of absence.

I love this post!
Kelly

Originally posted by Palynka
Good points, it's just that I believe that claim is not coherent with weak atheism but rather with strong agnosticism ("we cannot know god" ).

I believe an atheist is more honest than an agnostic if we simply
argue the point that people cannot know God since there are so
many who make the claim they do.
Kelly

Originally posted by Palynka
Originally posted by vistesd
[b]This seemed to me to fit the case of strong agnosticism of the second kind.If such an “I don’t know” is best labeled weak atheism, that’s fine with me.

I'm not convinced by that. If one assesses the question directly and cannot come up with either:
1) A belief in God
2) A belief in the absence of God
3) A bel distribution of those three beliefs is unknown (Edit - Although not necessarily unknowable).[/b]

I admit that I am grappling with this as I go, and have not settled on a final position vis-à-vis so-called “weak” atheism and agnosticism (perhaps, as I iterate through this discussion, I will be able to settle on one).

Under rwingett’s strict definition of atheist, if one canot come up with your 1) and 3), that results in a default position of atheism; and 2) serves no more purpose (if any) than to explain the character of that atheism (i.e., that it is not based on sufficient evidence to argue an active disbelief in god).

In such a case, agnostic itself becomes an explanatory term for the nature of one’s de facto atheism—viz., “agnostic atheism”—and agnosticism does not seem to represent a bona fide third option.

Under rwingett’s strict definition, it seems to me that ignosticism or theological noncognitivism would result in the same default position.

Now, I’m wondering if the terms “weak” and “strong” (or “negative and “positive” ) can be taken to also represent explanatory terms with regard to one’s atheism, rather than different actual positions. (This goes to the argument between rwingett and Dr. Scribbles.)

Setting the weak/strong argument aside, it seems to me that if one accepts rwingett’s definition, then his position is quite coherent, and has an advantage of clarity: there is either theism or atheism. The question then is whether his strict definition is an acceptable one, and why or why not. If I am defining a basic term one way, and you are defining it another way, then the remainder of our discussion is simply going past each other: we’re not really engaged.

EDIT: Am I correct in supposing that both you and Starrman and rwingett are all taking the same definition as the "knife-edge" one? Such that one who is not a theist is de facto an atheist? Or am I confused on that?

Originally posted by Starrman
I have to say I'm not big on metaphysical skepticism, I lean towards the positivists in thinking that much of such endeavours are a bottomless well. No matter how deep you drop the bucket, you're not going to bring back water.

I shall add Sextus to my list, though it grows too large to fit into one lifetime; perhaps I shall consider believing in reincarnation so as to finish it off in another.

What I meant was that Sextian (Pyrrhonic) skepticism is aimed primarily at metaphysical questions, not pragmatic ones such as: "Is that really a Mac truck bearing down one me?"

Originally posted by KellyJay
I would have flipped that, since being an atheist means no there is
none, while an agnositc doesn't believe there is enough to sway them
one way or another.
Kelly

Let me try to be more clear: I would think a weak atheist would think evidence to substantiate the claim about God may exist, it is just that they haven't heard it yet, or may never, not that it is impossible though.

An agnostic thinks there can never be such evidence, not waiting for it, it is unknowable, as in not enough to sway them either way, ever.

Originally posted by vistesd
I admit that I am grappling with this as I go, and have not settled on a final position vis-à-vis so-called “weak” atheism and agnosticism (perhaps, as I iterate through this discussion, I will be able to settle on one).

Under rwingett’s strict definition of atheist, your 1) and 3) result in a default position of atheism; and 2) serves no more purpose (if ...[text shortened]... e" one? Such that one who is not a theist is de facto an atheist? Or am I confused on that?

Now you've got me confused. I don't think I understand where you're trying to go here... 🙂

I wasn't addressing any of rwingett's definitions but Starmann's. Regarding rwingett's, personally I do not think that etymology alone can correctly resolve the problem. This comes from my somewhat evolutionary view on language as I feel that the concept of agnosticism came into place to clarify certain positions that fell under atheism and clearly sectioned what was formerly know as 'atheism', giving a more strict meaning to the word atheism itself. But I digress...

All three of the stances I've describe fall under theism (1) or atheism(2,3). I think you didn't look at them very carefully (ahem😉). My point was to illustrate that lack of belief in 1,2 or 3 is sufficiently different to justify a third stance.

The unwillingness of many agnostics to commit to rwingett's definition and claim "agnostic atheism" also justifies its separation, in my opinion. After all, when labeling individual beliefs, I think that labels must be accepted by those labeled or we run the risk of rendering the information value in them meaningless (when communicating).

Originally posted by Bad wolf
Let me try to be more clear: I would think a weak atheist would think evidence to substantiate the claim about God may exist, it is just that they haven't heard it yet, or may never, not that it is impossible though.

An agnostic thinks there can [b]never be such evidence, not waiting for it, it is unknowable, as in not enough to sway them either way, ever.[/b]

If I were to accept what you just said, than I'd say there is trully only
two camps that of atheists and theists.
Kelly

Originally posted by Palynka
Now you've got me confused. I don't think I understand where you're trying to go here... 🙂

I wasn't addressing any of rwingett's definitions but Starmann's. Regarding rwingett's, personally I do not think that etymology alone can correctly resolve the problem. This comes from my somewhat evolutionary view on language as I feel that the concept of agnosti risk of rendering the information value in them meaningless (when communicating).

Now you've got me confused. I don't think I understand where you're trying to go here...

Well, I’m sure it’s my own confusion confusing you! 🙂

All three of the stances I've describe fall under theism (1) or atheism(2,3). I think you didn't look at them very carefully (ahem ).

Okay. Gotcha. (Maybe I need more coffee...)

My point was to illustrate that lack of belief in 1,2 or 3 is sufficiently different to justify a third stance.

And this is where I think the argument is: whether or not agnosticism is itself a bona fide third stance. (Just poured myself another cup of caffeine.)

Despite my own arguments thus far (and yours) I’m not yet convinced that it is. Your 2) seems to be a statement of the “strong” variety, so I am not sure why lack of belief in all three ought not to result in what Starrman (and I think rwingett) called implicit atheism.

I agree about recognizing how people think of themselves, but I also think that we are capable of holding illusory views without realizing it. Rwingett claims that agnosticism is an illusory view based on a definitional confusion of atheism (thinking that it must reflect the so-called “strong” variety). Perhaps there are other reasons for such an illusory view as well.

Also, if one accepts agnosticism as a valid third stance, one seems to me to be implicitly rejecting any “knife-edge” definition, such as: “An atheist is anyone who does not hold a belief in god(s), regardless of the reasons (e.g., of the strong or weak variety, or because the concept is not coherent, or there is no way of knowing).” So I think the definition does matter; and could well resolve the question by bringing clarity.

Language may be evolutionary, but that does not mean that it necessarily becomes less confusing.

The question is: Why should agnosticism be seen as a valid stance distinct from implicit atheism (if it is), rather than as an explanatory statement about the reasons for such implicit atheism? If someone puts forth such a position, can they not be properly questioned as to whether such a “third stance” is not, in fact, illusory--except as an explanatory term?

Originally posted by Palynka
Personally, I consider absence of evidence as evidence of absence.

For all metaphysical entities that are not observable, I use the ignostic argument.

So if I lose my keys, they stop existing? Cool!

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Now you've got me confused. I don't think I understand where you're trying to go here...

Well, I’m sure it’s my own confusion confusing you! 🙂

All three of the stances I've describe fall under theism (1) or atheism(2,3). I think you didn't look at them very carefully (ahem ).

Okay. Gotcha. (Maybe I need more coffee... ...[text shortened]... such a “third stance” is not, in fact, illusory--except as an explanatory term?[/b]

Perhaps you're making this more difficult than it is. The current definitions for atheist and agnostic are what they are, regardless if it goes against rwingett's sensibilities. Maybe he also has a problem with using the term 'joy stick' for airplanes and video gaming because it's not the literal definition. Whatever. You guys can redefine terms all you want, but the underlying concepts are still going to be there. From what I've seen here, no one's proposed anything that can be classified as any real improvement. Even if someone did, its use is limited to this discussion. Good luck using it with the rest of the population. As to the idea of a 'de facto atheist' or 'implicit atheist'; for one, it goes againt the commonly accepted dictionary definition; for another, it's reminiscent of the Bush administration claim that if you are against the war in Iraq, then you are against the US (or even support terrorism) - 'If you're not fer us, you're agin us'. It just doesn't reflect reality.

Originally posted by scottishinnz
So if I lose my keys, they stop existing? Cool!

What do metaphysical keys look like?

Originally posted by scottishinnz
So if I lose my keys, they stop existing? Cool!

If you had them once, then there is no absence of evidence.

But please continue to make a fool of yourself. It's entertaining.

Edit: And you do know the difference between existence and evidence for existence, don't you? Good.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Now you've got me confused. I don't think I understand where you're trying to go here...

Well, I’m sure it’s my own confusion confusing you! 🙂

All three of the stances I've describe fall under theism (1) or atheism(2,3). I think you didn't look at them very carefully (ahem ).

Okay. Gotcha. (Maybe I need more coffee...)

My p ...[text shortened]... whether such a “third stance” is not, in fact, illusory--except as an explanatory term?[/b]

What do you mean (or Starmann) by implicit atheism? By what I understand, "implicit atheism" is being used to describe someone who has not yet addressed the question and therefore acts as if atheist. Is this correct?

The three beliefs I've described result in:
1) A belief in God - theism (include all forms here)
2) A belief in the absence of God - a strong variety of atheism
3) A belief that theists have failed to demonstrate their theistic claims. - a weak variety of atheism.

Do we agree up to here?

If yes, you say that lack of belief in all three can fall under "implicit atheism". But isn't there a 4th option that may characterized as agnosticism? I propose:

4) belief that the probability distribution of the above three beliefs is unknown

This means that, under this belief, choosing one of the above is tantamount to guessing (or something akin to taking a bet on which we cannot know the odds). This is someone that addressed the question directly AND (more importantly) it is a belief, so I personally feel that it is fundamentally different from implicit atheism.

I note that it is not that the existence of God is unknown in 4, but that the probability distribution itself is unknown.

Originally posted by Palynka
What do you mean (or Starmann) by implicit atheism? By what I understand, "implicit atheism" is being used to describe someone who has not yet addressed the question and therefore acts as if atheist. Is this correct?

The three beliefs I've described result in:
1) A belief in God - theism (include all forms here)
2) A belief in the absence of God - a str ...[text shortened]... existence of God is unknown in 4, but that the probability distribution itself is unknown.

The three beliefs I've described result in:
1) A belief in God - theism (include all forms here)
2) A belief in the absence of God - a strong variety of atheism
3) A belief that theists have failed to demonstrate their theistic claims. - a weak variety of atheism.

Do we agree up to here?

Yes.

If yes, you say that lack of belief in all three can fall under "implicit atheism". But isn't there a 4th option that may characterized as agnosticism? I propose:

4) belief that the probability distribution of the above three beliefs is unknown

First, I want to note that both you and I have offered very strict conditions under which we would admit agnosticism as a valid alternative. Yours seems more reasonable to me than my “Sextian” offering.

I am taking 4) broadly to entail a conclusion by the agnostic that there is no valid basis on which to form any belief whatsoever about the proposition “G or ~G.” Is that correct?

Originally posted by Palynka
What do you mean (or Starmann) by implicit atheism? By what I understand, "implicit atheism" is being used to describe someone who has not yet addressed the question and therefore acts as if atheist. Is this correct?

The three beliefs I've described result in:
1) A belief in God - theism (include all forms here)
2) A belief in the absence of God - a str existence of God is unknown in 4, but that the probability distribution itself is unknown.

Implicit atheism as I am using it refers to the notion that one s without god as a normative state and only chooses to explcitise (is that even a word?) for or against at a later point.

I don't see how we can really get to 4). If the probability distribution is unknown (I presume you mean not just that we have no exact figure, but that we simply have no information about that distribution at all), there is no possible belief state, it simply occupies the set of things we haven't got enough information on and falls into a lucky dip scenario. If we have a belief, we must have some sense of a distribution of credence between the various options, otherwise we wouldn't have any reason to hold a belief. Okay someone might be retarded enough to just stick a pin in a board and go 'I'll be a theist!' or somesuch, but if they remain without choosing, doesn't this still fall into the pit of implicit atheism? Aren't they still without god until such time as enough probability arises to sway them to choice?

Either that or we have some distribution which does not sum to credence (in other words there are unknown options or factors affecting the distribution such that we do not have a 100% spread), but I'm not sure how that could be so in our particular scenario and still avoid implicity.

Maybe I'm missing something here, but I don't see how 4) differs in outcome.

I'll get back to you about the other thing tomorrow, I'm not very well tonight and I haven't had the brain power.